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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL D ECISION NOTICE 
Name: Rambharose, Radesh Facility: Elmira CF 
NYSID: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 11-115-18 B 
DIN: 98-A-5595 · 
Appearances: Mackenzie Stutzman Esq. 
P.O. Box 111 
Bath, New York 14810 
Decision appealed: November 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s)· Davis, Alexander 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received March 25, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
v-Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit ' s Findings and.the sepa~.9te fitfdings, o.f 
th~ Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on =<"lo21 {!_cf/;O . 
. "' I r 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Rambharose, Radesh DIN: 98-A-5595  
Facility: Elmira CF AC No.:  11-115-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 5) 
 
     Appellant challenges the November 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold.  Appellant’s instant offense is Murder 2nd Degree in which he stabbed 
his girlfriend to death.  Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision lacks detail. 3) the Board failed to 
consider and/or approve conditional parole for deportation only. 4) the Board failed to make factual 
findings in support of the statutory standards cited. 5) the Board ignored the wishes and sentence 
of the sentencing court and illegally resentenced him. 6) statements made in the sentencing minutes 
by the victim’s family may not be considered. 7) the decision violates the due process clause of 
the constitution. 8) the Board never explains how they weighed the factors. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also 
considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor 
considered.  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 
A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017).   
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     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   T]he serious nature of the crimes for which the [inmate] was incarcerated and his prior criminal 
record  are sufficient grounds to deny parole release.”  Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 A.D.2d 931, 
618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994); see also Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 
N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter of Thurman 
v. Hodges, 292 A.D.2d 872, 873, 739 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 
N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Wright v. Travis, 284 A.D.2d 544, 727 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dept. 
2001). 
     The Board may consider the inmate had displayed an escalation of unlawful activities. Stanley v 
New York State Division of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dept. 2012). 
     The Board may place greater weight on an inmate’s disciplinary record even though infractions 
were incurred earlier in the inmate’s incarceration.  Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 
1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013). 
     The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry 
plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. 
Dep’t Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate 
release plan). 
     The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. 
Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed 
results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 
148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     The Board can give greater weight to statements made in the sentencing minutes. Williams v New 
York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is 
entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes. Platten v New York State Board of Parole, 153 A.D.3d 
1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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     The existence of a final deportation order does not require an inmate’s release, but is merely one 
factor to consider.  Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Lackwood v. New York State Div. of Parole, 127 A.D.3d 1495, 8 N.Y.S.3d 461 
(3d Dept. 2015); People ex rel. Borrell v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 85 A.D.3d 1515, 925 
N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 17 N.Y.3d 718, 936 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2011); Matter of Samuel v. 
Alexander, 69 A.D.3d 861, 892 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2d Dept. 2010). The Board denied parole, which 
encompasses CPDO.  Executive Law § 259-i.  The Board was not required to explicitly discuss 
CPDO in the decision.  Borrell v. Superintendent of Wende Corr. Facility, No. 12-CV-6582 CJS 
MWP, 2014 WL 297348, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), appeal dismissed (Oct. 31, 2014). 
Although appellant met the statutory criteria for CPDO eligibility, such eligibility, as noted is only 
one factor to be considered in granting parole under Executive Law §259-i(2)(d).  Eligibility does 
not equate to entitlement for parole release or preclude consideration of the usual factors in the 
Executive Law relevant to making that decision per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c). The Parole Board 
still has its discretion. Ortiz v. State Board of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 52, 668 N.Y.S.2d 823 (4th Dept. 
1998); leave denied 92 N.Y.2d 811, 680 N.Y.S.2d 457; Oyekoya v New York State Department 
of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 960, 714 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dept 2000); Hunter v New York State Division 
of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1178, 800 N.Y.S.2d 799 (3d Dept 2005); Borrell v New York State Board of 
Parole, 85 A.D.3d 1515, 925 N.Y.S.2d 922(3d Dept. 2011) lv.app.den. 17 N.Y.3d 718, 936 
N.Y.S.2d 75 (2011). 
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
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    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). That the sentencing court did not impose the maximum sentence is 
not an indication that the sentencing court made a favorable parole recommendation. Duffy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 74 A.D.3d 965, 903 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d  Dept.  2010). The minimum 
term of imprisonment in a plea agreement is not tantamount to a sentencing recommendation-and a 
parole denial does not thus constitute a re-sentencing. Gomez v New York State Division of Parole,  
87 A.D.3d 1197, 929 N.Y.S.2d 338 (3d Dept. 2011)  lv.app.den.  18 N.Y.3d 802, 938 N.Y.S.2d 860 
(2011). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Motti v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 114, 115, 863 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of 
Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 
2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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    The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and 
which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    The inmate may not review the Board’s weighing process or  assess whether the Board gave 
proper weight to the relevant factors, since it is not required to state each factor it considers, or 
weigh each factor equally or grant parole due to exemplary behavior. Comfort v New York State 
Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3rd Dept. 2009); Hamilton v New York 
State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). The due process 
clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be 
second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State 
Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
         In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
